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William Wilson's article "Herder, Folklore andRomantic Nationalism" 
presents the dominant view in folklore that the roots of our discipline are 
tied to nationalistic motives: 
[Serious folklore studies] were from the beginning intimately associated with 
emergent romantic nationalistic movements in which zealous scholar-patriots 
searched the folklore record of the past not just to see how people lived in 
by-gone days-the principal interest of the antiquarians-but primarily to 
discover "historical" models on which to reshape the present and build the 
future. (1973:819) 
Certainly it is true that these romantics were trying to effect change in their 
political climate by reformulating the past, but ideology governed this 
reformulation. Wilson simplifies romantic nationalism as "the wistful dream 
of scholars and poets who endeavored through constant education and 
propaganda to rekindle the spark of national consciousness in the hearts of 
their fellow countrymen" (1973:820). 
In Germany, this dream of romantic nationalism was born out of a 
new worla conception, a mythology if you will; and, as mythos it was 
comprised of both immediate and ultimate concerns. To ignore the 
mythological aspect of the origin of our own field is to pretend in effect that 
we are myth-free. We must apply to our own history the realizations we 
have gleaned from the study of others. 
Nationalism was part of a larger movement, loosely called modern 
humanism (Schiitze 1920). Modern humanism contains as an essential 
characteristic a conflict between the ideal and the actual: romantic 
nationalism, as product of these ideas, contains the same tensions. This 
movement strove to manifest the ideal nation in the actual world; thus 
folklore began as a reformist endeavor. Herder's philosophy was essentially 
a critique of his times, and his concept of nationalism emerged out of that 
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critique. "Herder's attack on his own century can no longer be of so great 
interest as his revolutionary idea of the autonomy of each individual culture. 
In the eyes of its author, however, the idea was probably a by-product" 
(Clark 1955: 196). 
An examination of the historical currents of the eighteenth century 
helps to create a contextual backdrop for evaluating Herder's work. German 
intellectual life was more advanced than the country's social and political 
development. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, a loose 
confederation of small states, was still in existence, and aside from one or 
two exceptions, Germany had no statesmen who could act to change this 
fragmentation. Constant comparison occurred between countries on the 
Continent, a situation which may be difficult for Americans to imagine. At 
this time cultural relativism was being invented and its implications thought 
through. Modern humanistic ideology is largely responsible for our ability 
to conceive of different conditions in each country as historical and cultural 
rather than as more or less advanced; that is, it may be this line of thought 
that moved us beyond notions of evolution. 
Germmy had suffered the disruptions of the Reformation, the Counter- 
Reformation, and the Thirty Years War all during the seventeenth-century; 
it was divided into 1,800 different territories with an equal number of 
rulers. Among the elite, foreign influences dominated; in fact, most elites 
spoke languages different from those in lower classes, making 
communication impossible. Aristocrats imitated the court life at Versailles, 
and these French habits were filtering through to the middle classes. 
German writers not only used French as their medium of expression but 
also adopted French and classical models to shape form and content. 
Similarly, the language of the intellectuals was Latin, used exclusively in 
the schools: during this period, Kant, in a revolutionary act, lectured in 
German for the first time. 
Through modern humanism, a shift in understanding had been 
accomplished. Until that time, foreign influences were not seen as 
demeaning but as uplifting what some saw as a backward culture. Germans 
did not consider themselves as an autonomous culture, but instead the upper 
and middle classes evaluated themselves in relation to other cultures which 
they considered superior. Through modem humanism, Germans began to 
conceive of themselves as having an independent and valuable cultural 
heritage. Clearly, this shift occurring in the intellectual class was related to 
the Enlightenment in France and Britain. 
There was much intellectual and artistic exchange between these 
countries. With the Enlightenment had come another set of abstract ideals 
by which knowledge was measured, and what was not rational according to 
this measurement was considered irrational and thus false. Herder revolted 
HERDER, FOLKLORE, AND MODERN HUMANISM 53 
against the Enlightenment and its emphasis on reason and argued for the 
importance of the emotions, which united feeling with reason. Clark sums 
up Herder's aim as being "the destruction of what may be called the caste 
system in eighteenth century philosophic anthropology" (1955:249). Great 
changes were occurring in the intellectual and the political worlds. The 
French and American revolutions helped to characterize the period as a time 
of action: the Sturm und Drang movement has been termed by Ergang, "the 
German form of the French revolution" (1966: 192). 
Many view Herder's work and involvement in intellectual movements 
in a cursory way, emphasizing his association with great philosophers and 
literary figures of his day, and overlook his profession as a preacher. Born 
in East Prussia in 1744 to a poor family, he was able to develop a good 
hand for calligraphy and came to work for his teacher, Trecho. Herder 
began to satiate his desire for knowledge in Trecho's library. Through 
Trecho, he met an officer who offered to support his medical training, but 
Herder could not stand the sight of blood and so enrolled as a theology 
student; legend has it that he was so poor that he survived on no money and 
lived for some time on only bread and water. 
Herder worked as preacher but his orthodoxy was often challenged, 
despite his strong commitment to leading his congregation to spiritual 
regeneration. He felt called to restore harmony between the world and the 
will of God; he considered the absence of this harmony to be the origin of 
spiritual degeneration of his day (Gillies 1945:58). And though his peasant 
congregation did not always understand him and often wanted a more 
orthodox approach, Herder delivered brilliant sermons (Gillies 1945:58). 
Chronicler Alexander Gillies summarizes their content: 
The existence of a divine purpose in the world, which is inscrutable and 
cannot be fully revealed until the end; the activity of God throughout all 
nature; the demand that life should obey the divine laws of nature, and fulfill 
the puwers that have been given to it; the condemnation of sins, 
unnaturalness, or a falling-away from God's purpose; a Peagian assumption 
of the innate purity in man; the assertion that the one central factor in all 
human effort is religion and that religion is founded upon revelation and 
faith-all these are themes that Herder is constantly expanding and stressing. 
(1945:62) 
This message was not exclusively religious for Herder but penetrated each 
subject he took up; he read widely and attempted to rebuild various areas 
of study by giving them new spiritual and philosophical foundations. 
All of Herder's vast work bore the same sub-structure: an examination 
of humans as moral and spiritual beings. Herder assumed that people evolve 
spiritually; he termed the ultimate end of this evolution Humanitat 
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(humanity). "Humanity, " he wrote, "is the character of our race . . . we do 
not bring it ready-made into the world. But in the world it must be the goal 
of our strivings, the sum of our exercises, our guiding value" (Herder 
quoted in Wilson 1973:823). With this assumption, he proceeded with his 
reinterpretation and formulated a dissertation which consciously included the 
idea of humans having both purpose and destiny. 
His conception of nature illustrated his assumptions; it was based on the 
unification of different forms of knowledge. He saw, for example, no 
reason why purely scientific investigation should embarrass religion, which 
he considered the palladium of truth (Clark 1955:275). He saw nature as 
"a universe filled with the spirit of God, progressively revealing Himself 
and completing His work through nature and man" (Herder in Gillies 
1945:54). Awareness of matter resulted from the recognition of this 
omnipresence of divinity. "Through the similarity of the effects of this 
'energy' or 'force' in nature to its effects in us we become aware, according 
to Herder's psychology of 1778, of what we call matter" (Clark 1955:223). 
God speaks to people through nature by analogy-that is, in understandable 
terms. HerJer conceived of nature as an artist and therefore brought the 
natural sciences more closely together with aesthetics, bridging the already- 
established dichotomy between science and art. 
Nature, the greatest artist of all, economically re-uses its protoforms as the 
human artist re-uses the fundamental structures of all art, and the over-all 
effect is that of an ascending series culminating in man, who is thus akin to 
all creation but not derived from it by any process of physical transformation. 
(Herder in Clark 1955:306) 
Herder conceptualized evolution as symbolic rather than temporal. 
Just as in nature, Herder saw artistic genius in poetry, which was to 
him the mechanism of the universe. 
[For Herder] Shakespeare was more than divinely inspired; that he was 
god-like, a creator in miniature, whose work followed and dustrated the same 
process of Creation itself. . . . The poet's function is to make known God's 
purpose; to interpret nature or the universe, of which he is a part, by making 
it live again, by reconstructing and reproducing its modes of operation, by 
re-creating it, as it were, before the eyes and ears of his fellow-men, so that 
they may perceive and comprehend its workings. (Gillies 1945:49-50) 
Herder similarly considered philosophical systems as poetry (Dichtung) 
unless they could be applied (Clark 1955: 178). 
He li !tied poetry with revelation in several ways. Herder suggested 
that "poetry was originally theology, " but he later inverted this notion when 
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he conceptualized theology as poetry. "The oldest and most venerable 
heathen poets, lawgivers, fathers and educators of mankind, Orpheus and 
Epimenodes and all the fabulous names of early time, sang of the gods and 
gave rapture to the world" (Gillies 194555). The Old Testament was for 
him a kind of poetic folk song. "One can see," he wrote, "that I am not 
here using poetry to mean falsehood; for in the realm of understanding the 
significance of the poetically composed symbol is truth" (Herder in Clark 
1955:297). Neither does he deny the possibility of the role of history in 
shaping the quality and content of the poetry. The universe, for him, was 
permeated by God: "history and revelation were thus identical" (Gillies 
1945:54). 
Clearly, there is difficulty in discussing one topic in isolation when 
considering Herder's work. He made connections with disparate realms of 
thought and aspects of man's nature that had not been central foci of the 
Enlightenment. The superiority of reason over sensibility was challenged by 
the new unity of being and purpose which Herder proclaimed. Herder's 
arguments were persuasively shaped by his revolt against the 
Enlightenment, for in a significant way its narrow-mindedness inspired him 
to articulate a more comprehensive philosophy. 
One of the best examples of his confrontation with a rationalistic 
perspective is his criticism of Kant. Kant held that humans were animals 
who needed a master; Herder posited, to the contrary, that "man is an 
animal as long as he needs a master to rule over him; as soon as he attains 
the status of a human being he no longer needs a master in any real sense" 
(Herder in Barnard 1969:323). In this juxtaposition one can see Herder's 
main counter-argument to Enlightenment thinking. Whereas the 
Enlightenment had placed human beings at the peak of history-the dawn 
of a new age, Herder reinstated the continuity of human life and joined 
together what could not fit under the umbrella of pure reason-sensibility 
and will. Thus, he automatically identified not only areas for action-the 
arts, for example-but also a directive for the will, and an ultimate goal; he 
preached the possibility that these three aspects of human experience could 
become unified. 
Unification is a central impulse in Herder's work and one of the goals 
of modern humanism. Several authors have noted Herder's remarkable 
similarity to Faust and suggested that Goethe must have based this character 
in part on Herder; Goethe, in fact, did directly quote him. According to 
Gillies, "Herder shows at this time more than a little affinity with Faust. 
The desire to grasp the whole of the universe and to set forth its meaning 
so as 'To help or convert a fellow creature [Faust]' is certain" (1945:61). 
"His chief aim," writes historian Robert Ergang, "[is] to understand the 
purpose and destiny of man as an inhabitant of this earth" (1966:82). To 
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that end, Herder began by looking at mankind, placing him at the center, 
in order to come to a new understanding. 
In his early work Herder posited a new conception of the difference 
between the human and the animal: the two were distinguished by the fact 
that humans can speak. Language, for him, was the outward manifestation 
of Bessonenheit (reflection), while reason was its internal function. 
"Language is the real external, as reason is the real internal character 
essential factor to our species" (Herder in Schiitze 1925:528). He did not 
consider reason as a distinct faculty of mind, but indicated that reason could 
be employed to different degrees: "But does thinking rationally mean the 
same as thinking with fully developed reason? Does it mean that an infant 
thinks reflectively or uses logic like a sophist at his desk? It is clear that 
such an objection does not touch the mental power as such but only 
different degrees of use" (Herder in Schiitze 1925:529). Through the 
development of reason, people become creators and acquire a kind of 
freedom within nature. "By virtue of 'Bessonenheit' every idea ceases to 
be an immediate work of nature and becomes man's own work. No longer 
an infallible machine of nature, man creates the motives and purposes of his 
own constructive efforts" (Herder in Schiitze 1925:529). Again, Herder 
extended the Enlightenment tenet of the human being as a perfected machine 
of nature to include a will: "Knowledge without will is false and incomplete 
knowledge . . . Impulse is the mainspring of being" (Herder in Schiitze 
1925:536). 
In his system Herder offered a primary unity of thought, will, and 
feeling and so synthesized science and philosophy, two polar modes of 
thought-rationalism which understood existence to be governed by nerve 
processes, and vitalistic naturalism which defined being as governed by 
impulse. He described sensibility, will, and thought as acting reciprocally 
and argued that each always be interpreted in relation to the other two. 
"Isolation of genetic conditions, of technique, subject matter, inherent 
mental, moral, and aesthetic character, is contrary to the unity which 
functions integrally throughout the activities of the living individual" 
(Herder in Schiitze 1925:541). For Herder, sensibility led to knowledge 
rather than threatened it: "We must conclude that the strongest passions and 
impulse properly ordered, are merely the sensible outline of strong reason 
within them" (Herder in Schiitze 1925:547). 
Establishing the primacy of human aspects more directly associated 
with feeling, Herder stated that the arts should not be based on clearly 
defined models established by the reasoning self; that is, one need not 
comply with classical rules. Indeed, he challenged the very heart of 
Enlightenment thinking by suggesting that there are other sources of 
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knowledge beyond that of pure thought, ways of knowing which precede 
reason. 
This is therefore the principal law according to which nature has regulated 
both faculties; namely, that feeling operates where perception cannot yet be; 
that it introduces a great deal at once into the soul obscurely, so that this latter 
may clarify it to some extent and discover thereby what its own existence can 
achieve; that this takes place in the easiest and pleasantest possible way so that 
the greatest possible amount may be perceived in the shortest possible time, 
and the soul may be gently led forth outside itself in its operations, as if it 
were operating in isolation and concerned only with itself. . . . In every 
minute part of the infinite prevails the truth, wisdom and goodness of the 
whole; in every perception, as in every feeling is reflected the image of God, 
there with the rays or the brilliance of white light, here into which the 
sunbeam is divided. . . . Honour therefore, the genius of mankind and seek 
to serve it as purely as you can. (Herder in Gillies 1945:71) 
Similarly, Herder conceived of reason not as distinct from feeling but 
"nothing more than something formed by experience, an acquired 
knowledge of the propositions and directions of ideas and faculties, to which 
man is fashioned by his organization and mode of life" (Herder in Barnard 
1969:264). Rather than viewing reason as an a priori faculty, Herder saw 
it "as the accumulation or product of the impressions that are received, the 
examples that are followed, and the internal power and energy with which 
they are assimilated within the individual mind" (Herder in Barnard 
1969:264-265). 
Herder's philosophy of history was in effect an epistemological 
inquiry. His process of reexamination hinges on two central principles: that 
a people's knowledge is shaped by the environment, and-more difficult to 
identify-that there is a divine will manifested through the process of 
Creation, which has its end in Humanity. "Man considered as an animal is 
the child of the earth and is attached to it as his habitation; but considered 
as a human being, as a creature of Humanitiit, he has the seeds of 
immorlality within him and these require planting in other soil" (Herder in 
Barnard 1969:280). For Herder, people are at once animalistic and human, 
and they strive to emphasize their humanity. Their mission is what Herder 
calls "paligenesis [which] means . . . a purification and regeneration of our 
whole life in this world as a means of winning a higher than earthly life" 
(Herder in Gillies 1945: 99). 
Understanding the notion of continuity in Herder's work is vital to 
comprehending his philosophies of history and nationalism. Edgar Schick 
(1971) reads Herder's work as poetry, identifies the primary images of 
organicism, and finds a continuity of thought and execution. Herder 
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described the nature of thought, feeling, and will as being one and 
articulated a system which united these impulses. Schick further illustrates 
Herder's consistency of feeling and thought, but more interestingly 
demonstrates the relationship between these two and the will. We have seen 
how Herder found unity in every subject he approached, recasting each 
according to his own longing and faith. 
Summarizing Herder's understanding of the relationship between mind, 
sensibility, and will, Schiitze draws the following conclusions: 1) Mind and 
sensibility are one and can only be separated in words; 2) pure reason is a 
delusion because it originates and remains in the sensibility and stays there; 
3) ridding oneself of the sensibility does not liberate reason; 4) people 
cannot demonstrate their own immortality; and 5) absolute being, or 
immortality, is an article of faith, but faith generates its own truth from 
sensibility rather than reason (1925:550). Faith is not excluded from 
Herder's thought: it is instead the goal of human will. Thus, we can 
understand the nature of his pedagogy and his concept of Humanitit, which 
he claimed as the foundation of his work. 
Herder's thoughts on history and nationalism have a tendency to 
overshadow their foundation in modem humanism. His main impulse was 
to synthesize disparate aspects of human knowledge and redefine knowing 
as involvicg various facets of the personality and as being shaped by the 
environment and the genetic force of Divine Nature. This process could be 
called "crestive analogy," beyond mere analogy because it entails more than 
the breaking down of boundaries between preformulated logical systems. 
Infusing faith, longing, and will, Herder created a new relationship between 
different aspects of thought, between preestablished dualisms. Frederick 
Smith in Studies of Religion under German Masters characterizes Herder as 
"the great master who led his way back into this ancient time" as captured 
in the folk poetry he studied (Smith 1880:131). "Herder penetrated the 
recesses of that time when sense and spirit were one, because this was the 
secret of his own inward life. . . . All his labours, as philosopher, 
theologian, critic, historian, and scientific inquirer, have this as their aim, 
to bring man back to the point, whence he started as a child, of harmony 
within himself and between himself and the universe around him" (Smith 
1880: 131-132). But Herder could not be called a primitive thinker, for we 
tend to conceive the primitive as not choosing harmony consciously over 
other forms of thought. 
According to Gillies, Herder's own desire became problematic. The 
harmony he consciously sought through his pedagogy did not correspond 
with his own environment: 
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The trouble arose from Herder's strong pedagogic sense, from the desire to 
criticize and to improve his own age, and ultimately, therefore, from his own 
personal dissatisfaction. This clearly conflicted with his historical outlook, as 
it had done before. Herder was always seeking deficiencies and striving to 
eliminate them, always seeking and never finding harmony between himself 
and the world. . . . Humanitiit was now Herder's consolation in the face of 
contemporary shortcomings; he clung to it with great-but not 
unshaken-optimism, and into it projected the qualities he missed so much 
around him-peace, religion, sympathy, equity, reason, truth. He proclaimed 
his doctrine, which rested on personal longing, as if it were the law of nature. 
(Gillies 1945:93) 
The nature of Herder's pedagogy was two-fold, critiquing the existing 
social, political, intellectual, and spiritual situation as well as illustrating the 
ideal process with which people need to establish contact. Inseparable from 
these two tendencies, Herder suggested how to realize this pedagogy, 
nowhere more frequently than in his discussions of the nation. 
Herder's conceptions of nationalism and ideal culture were strongly 
influenced by his reading of Giambattista Vico's Scienza Nuova. From Vico 
he borrowed two significant ideas. He focused on the existence of different 
historic ages, which evolve from one another in the continuity of history. 
He also embraced the notion that each historical epoch forms an 
independent cultural entity whose various parts are integrally related to form 
an organic whole. Similarly, Herder borrowed from Montesquieu the idea 
that cultural types are primarily determined by the physical environment in 
which the nations are located. From these ideas emerged his philosophy of 
history which assumes that history is "a stream that flows unceasingly 
toward the ocean of humanity" (Herder in Ergang 1966:220). While 
Aristotle had placed the city-state at the end of history, and Vico the 
idealized civilization, Herder envisioned "Humanity" as the ultimate goal of 
the historical process. 
For Herder, history takes place in terms of organic entities of culture: 
"Each age, each nation possesses an individuality, with temporal or local 
characteristics, never to be repeated; it cannot be other than imperfect. It 
cannot be judged by any standards other than its own, since they are equally 
imperfect; it carries its own criterion within itself" (Herder in Gillies 
1945:65). History is then "an account of ethnic groups or nationalities 
considered as historical, genetic, organic entities. In each national group 
there is an active power which, influenced by environment and tradition, 
effects an orderly development or historical continuity" (Herder in Ergang 
1966:220). One is not to study individuals or political events, but "all that 
the nationalities did and thought" (Herder in Ergang 1966:220). The study 
is to be undertaken by means of sympathy rather than abstract reasoning; 
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the subject must be regarded "in the spirit of the age (Zeitgeist)" (Herder 
in Ergang 1966:216). 
This ideal notion of the nation as an organic unit proved particularly 
challenging in the practical world. Other aspects of Herder's conception of 
nationalism must be considered in close relation to his period. Again, 
Germany had been exposed to many foreign influences. As Gillies states, 
"The loss of Charles the Great's folksong collection, the Latin domination 
of German culture in the Middle Ages, followed by the Renaissance and 
Wars of Religion-had cheated German literature of its due, so weakened 
it as to make it subservient to French literature, and made an irreparable 
breach between the present and its own national past" (1945:Sl). 
Meanwhile, contemporary thinkers considered nationality as an obstruction 
to humanity. In all cases, Herder used nation to denote a cultural rather 
than political distinction. Thus, the nation becomes the central factor in 
human development but still not an end in itself. Opposing the shallow 
individualism of his time, Herder clearly articulated how individual needs, 
selves, and knowledge related to those of the group (Ergang 1966:248). 
"For no one of us is by himself alone. The whole structure of man's 
humanity is connected by a spiritual genesis-education-with his parents, 
teachers and friends, with all the circumstances of life, and hence with his 
countrymen and forefathers. Indeed, in the last analysis, he is connected 
with the whole chain of the human species, since some links of this chain 
inevitably come into contact with, and thus act upon, the development of 
mental powers" (Herder in Barnard 1969:3 12-3 13). 
With Herder's thinking about nationality he began to apply his whole 
abstract epistemology to the concrete world: on this subject he united his 
most idealistic thoughts and his criticism of contemporary trends. Between 
these conflicting projects, he proposed techniques for bridging this gap 
between the ideal and the practical. Even within his work he recognized, 
and struggled over, the presence of conflicting impulses. In his early travel 
journal, he showed himself tom between becoming "a man of action" or 
pursuing his intellectual insights (Barnard 1969). Accordingly, he later 
voiced concern about the effect and influence of his work-that is, whether 
it had a substantial Wirhng-and wrote "complete truth is always and 
exclusively action" (Clark 1955:230). Ultimately, both his activism and his 
thought concentrated on the nation. 
This activism could not have happened apart from his focus on culture; 
Ergang outiines three main reasons for a lack of political interest at that 
time. Government was monopolized by rulers; absolutism was common. 
Conditions were poor, and minds were turned away: "Political resignation 
seems to have been widespread." Writings were still censored at this time 
(Ergang 1966:240). Intellectually, Herder challenged the Enlightenment 
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view that negated the cultural lines which he believed nature had drawn; 
"the members of nationality and state are joined together by inner spiritual 
bonds" (Ergang 1966: 101). Herder proclaimed that these differences were 
decreed by God and must be emphasized rather than ignored or erased 
(Ergang 1966:92). "In contrast to the division of the German people and the 
drab political affairs of his time, he [Herder] continually reminded the 
German people of their common part and of the heritage which must be 
preserved if German culture was to continue to exist" (Ergang 1966:231- 
32). Preaching a doctrine of self-realization (at the level of nation), he 
sought to "eliminate the boundaries between classes by stimulating the 
national feeling, national consciousness" (Herder in Ergang 196652). 
A nation's consciousness, thought Herder, should naturally produce its 
own expressive forms; so the absence of a unique and explicitly German 
literature troubled him. He explained Germany's lack of literature as a lack 
of connection to its essential character and happiness: 
Thus, from ancient times we have absolutely no living poetic literature upon 
which our modern poetry might grow, as a branch upon a national stem; 
whereas other nations have progressed with the centuries, and have shaped 
themselves upon their soil, from native products, upon the belief and taste of 
the people, from the remains of the past. In that way their language and 
literature have become national, the voice of the people has been used and 
cherished, they have secured more of a public in these matters than we 
Germans have. We poor Germans were destined from the start never to 
remain ourselves; ever to be the lawgivers and servants of foreign 
nationalities, the directors of the fate and their battered, bleeding, exhausted 
slaves. (Herder in Gillies 194552) 
Ergang points out that Herder was the first to explain to the German people, 
"in a way both large and impressive, the idea that literature is the 
evolutionary product of national conditions" (Ergang 1966: 190). Thus, he 
not only identified the causes for the absence of literature but also, and 
more importantly, hastened the advent of a cure. Herder states that "there 
is no absolute poison in nature which might not on the whole be also a 
medicament and a balm" (Ergang 1966: 198). Herder diagnosed the illness 
(the lack of literature) as a result of Germany's breaking away from her 
own cultural foundation; only a reconnection to this essential identity could 
cure the nation. 
To connect with this source of culture, people would have to identify 
the most recent time in German history when the spiritual connection was 
still present: the Middle Ages. Herder thus recreated the idea of the volk; 
no longer were they the rabble of the streets, but "the body of the 
nationality." This group, which had remained on its national foundations, 
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was most in harmony with the national soul (Ergang 1966:195). Folklore 
was the instrument of his social program; through this medium, one could 
work to change the present situation. According to Ergang, Herder 
suggested "that they go back to the sources of their own language and 
literature and liberate the former power and noble spirit which, 
unrecognized up to now, lie dormant in the documents of the national past" 
(Ergang 1966:235). He described the native language as being "filled with 
the life and blood of our forefathers" and thought that folklore was a 
treasure to be unlocked to release its spirit and heal his nation (Ergang 
1966:253). 
The persistence of vestigal elements in culture is balanced by eternal rebirth 
through 'evolutions' rather than revolutions, through orderly cyclic 
progressions rather than through violent upheavals. It is the nature of culture 
that institutions, long since outlived, manage to perpetuate themselves long 
after loss of their functional value, while from the very embrace of senility 
arises the promise of a new day. (Herder quoted in Clark 1955:363) 
Here again, Herder observed the real workings of culture and contrasts this 
reality with his ideal. 
This  contrast is  even clearer in his thinking about relationships within 
and between nations. 
It is nature which educates families: the most natural state is therefore, one 
nation, an extended family with one national character. . . . Nothing, 
therefore, is more manifestly contrary to the purpose of political government 
that the unnatural enlargement of states, the wild mixing of various races and 
nationalities under one sceptre. (Herder quoted in Barnard 1965:324) 
Although this statement easily could be read as foreshadowing a racist love 
of "purity," Herder was in fact referring exclusively to the "unnatural 
enlargement of states" taken up by government. His emphasis on the 
importance of remaining on one's cultural foundation conflicted with his 
goal of not becoming self-contained on the other. "It was not his goal," 
writes Ergang, "to make the German nationality self-contained. . . . 
Although he was vehemently opposed to imitation of other nationalities, he 
wished his countrymen to learn from the example of others, to emulate their 
great achievements" (Ergang 1966:265). The borrowing, then, would 
represent an improvement, a deeper understanding: Germans would not just 
take on the ways of others but find their roots in humanity. 
I walk through strange gardens merely to get flowers for my language, the 
betrothed of my mode of thought. I see strange customs so that I may bring 
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mine, like fruits ripened by a foreign sun, as an offering to the genius of my 
fatherland. (Herder in Ergang 1966: 160) 
Here Herder advocated a method for social action: he did not meditate on 
the nature of Germany's penchant for imitation, but instead tried to conquer 
it with his strict focus on the commitment to one's nation. Still the 
foundation of his nationalism "was human brotherhood. . . he was driven 
by the desire of . . . having them fulfill their mission to mankind" (Ergang 
1966:263). However, he could only suggest preliminary steps to transform 
his ideal into reality. 
Schiitze suggests that Herder's basic purpose was to force people to 
recognize the centrality of personality, of individuality; this individual is not 
the shallow, isolated subject of the Enlightenment, but rather one formed 
by cultural diversity and the depth of history. Herder's work strove to bring 
this individuality into awareness; he encouraged his contemporaries to offer 
up the richness of their culture simply because it belonged to them, and not 
because it passed the test of some abstract and celebrated measurement. So, 
his work focused on the nation, and he urgently identified ways in which 
the individual consciousness could be re-awakened in terms of a cultural 
heritage. In addition to the possibility of changing culture, Herder 
recognized the importance of the individual. 
It was during this period that the individual was first being recognized 
as an entity. Psychology was just beginning as a science, and there is 
evidence that Herder read widely in this area, expecting great things from 
it (Clark 1955:93). So Herder emphasized change at both the national and 
individual levels: 
It is possible to overcome egolsm, whether this be innate or acquired from 
one's environment, to free oneself from the irregularities of too singular a 
condition, and, ultimately released from the peculiarities of the national, 
temporal, personal taste, to grasp beauty wherever found, in all times and all 
kinds of taste. . . . He is initiated into the Mysteries of the Muses and of all 
times and memories and works. The sphere of taste is unlimited as the history 
of mankind. Its periphery lies through all the centuries and their works; its 
center is he. (Schiitze 1925:521). 
Herder's focus extends beyond culture: "The deepest foundation of our 
being both in sensibility and in thought is individual" (Schiitze 1925542- 
43). Since the content of his sermons is not available to us, it is difficult to 
say to what degree he tried to change individuals. But there is evidence that 
he preached on the importance of a well-balanced life as a prerequisite to 
work in the arts and sciences, so that a reform of life must precede a 
reform of the arts (Gillies 1945:73). "The highest knowledge is undoubtedly 
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the art of living; and how many men have been robbed by their fine arts of 
this one thing, this divine art" (Gillies 1945:73). Schutze's brand of modern 
humanism involves four necessary components: genetic history, biological 
growth, the social character of man, and the unity of these three in the 
individual personality (Schiitze 1925549). 
Herder came to his conceptualization of humanism by trying to correct 
the narrow thinking of the Enlightenment and to effect change in his time. 
He conceived of a holistic universe by applying the precepts of Leibniz and 
Spinoza, creating a system which releases cultures from domination; thus 
he unified these different forms of knowledge. In validating the experiences 
of each culture, he also accommodated intuition, sensibility, and 
intentionality. 
Herder's vast but unifying thought has been taken in bits and pieces; 
some have said his greatest contribution was the inspiration he gave to 
Goethe, the Grimm brothers, and other contemporaries. Because German 
romanticists took Herder's nationalism and adopted it for their own 
purposes, our understanding of him is filtered through their perceptions 
(Clark 1955:418). As we consider our own history as a discipline, we must 
examine the entirety of our roots; we resist the inclination to isolate a single 
application of a historical work and examine it out of context. The impulse 
which preceded the "wedding with nationalism, " as Wilson calls it, is most 
profoundly the pursuit of freedom-not in the American sense of civil 
rights, not political per se-but cultural and individual, especially in the 
sense of the inner life. For Herder, freedom could always be discovered in 
culture, as there is onlyfreedom within law: "The first germ of freedom is 
to perceive that one is not free, and to know the bonds by which one is 
held" (Schiitze 1925:539). 
To find freedom in our culture, we need to re-examine our intellectual 
heritage, criticize the ways in which our predecessors applied their insights, 
as well as understand the fullness and complexity of their inspiration. To 
learn from Herder's difficulties, we must identify and acknowledge the 
aspirations which guide our own work today. Three centuries have not 
bridged the gap between the ideal and the practical. 
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